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and Bioethics 
by Carl Cohen 
A morally right act is one that ought to be done. 
A morally good agent is one who generally does 
what he believes he ought to do. But there may 
be a great difference between the act a person ought 
to do in a given circumstance, and the act that person 
earnestly believes he ought to do. In passing 
judgment on civil disobedience, therefore, we should 
bear in mind the distinction between rightness of 
action and goodness of character. When civil 
disobedients deliberately break the law, in public 
conscientious protest, we want to know whether their 
acts are morally right. 
The target of the disobedient’s protest may be 
itself a law, or it may be a policy or a practice of 
government or of private parties. Targets differ, but 
in every case the disobedient is utterly convinced 
that the object of his protest is so plainly evil, so 
patently unconscionable and intolerable, as to 
demand action that would be unjustifiable under 
other circumstances. There is usually little doubt 
about the subjective integrity of the protesters. Is 
their disobedience objectively justifiable? 
The serious difficulties encountered in providing 
such justifications are exhibited in the essays that 
follow. In them the deliberate violation of law is 
defended as a protest against what is believed to 
be: the brutal murder of babies [Leber, representing 
Operation Rescue, and Nathanson]; the abridge- 
ment of reproductive rights, including the right to 
abortion [Davis, representing Women’s Health 
Action and Mobilization (WHAM!)]; the deliberate 
governmental refusal to assist those suffering from 
AIDS [Spiers, representing ACTUP, and Novick]; and 
the intolerable abuse of the rights of animals [Siegel, 
representing Trans-Species Unlimited; Jackson, 
representing People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals; and Singer]. These authors are morally 
certain that the wrongs they protest do justify 
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deliberate law-breaking. Against those alleged 
atrocities they express nothing short of moral fury. 
They are outraged. 
Of course what outrages some does not outrage 
others. Peter Singer, a distinguished moral phdos- 
opher, remarks that the violation of law (which he 
finds sometimes defensible on behalf of animals) 
is “misguided” when undertaken to protest the term- 
ination of prenatal human life (Singer, p. 43). Others 
may doubt that the American government’s policies 
regarding AIDS constitute “passive genocide” 
(Spiers, p. 34) and justify civil disobedience. And 
of course, what Leber and Nathanson regard as 
disobedient self-sacrifice to save the lives of innocent 
babies is viewed by Davis (p. 33) as a “terror crusade.” 
But suppose that there are some cases of 
objectively justifiable civil disobedience. What form 
will the moral justification take? What principles 
apply? Some of the thorniest questions in political 
philosophy, regarding the limits of state authority 
and the duties of citizens, are inescapably raised 
here. Two points are likely to meet with general 
agreement: first, different kinds of disobedience call 
for different justifications, and second, what one 
believes an adequate justification depends in part 
upon the kind of moral theory held. 
Direct Civil Disobedience 
For some disobedient protesters, the appeal will 
be to a higher law of some description-the laws 
of God, or of Nature-having an indubitable 
authority that simply overrides the authority of the 
state. On this view there are “unchanging reference 
points.. . decreed by our Creator and found in His 
book” (Leber, p. 27) and therefore when one 
deliberately violates a law of the state to comply 
with God’s law the act is not one of disobedience 
at all, but “biblical obedience” (p. 2’7). 
Higher-law justifications of civil disobedience 
encounter perennial difficulties: the source, 
authority, and content-and even the meaning- 
of such laws, if there are any, are matters of unending 
dispute. Higher-law claims by earnest and adamant 
protesters conflict even with one another, and are 
as difficult to prove false as to verify. Such difficulties 
do not trouble those who are morally certain they 
know the higher law, and who break the state’s law 
in obedience to it-but their profound conviction 
has little persuasive and no probative force. 
Higher-law justification is most appealing when 
the law broken is itself the target of the protest, 
when the disobedience is direct. If the law of the 
state requires what Divine command forbids, the 
choice of the believer is clear. Many who conscien- 
tiously violated the segregation statutes of southern 
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states in the 1950s and 60s acted in this religious 
spirit, appealing to God’s law in urging disobedience. 
Of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 Emerson said, 
with a literal force many of us can share: “By God, 
I will not obey it!” 
But when the object of moral concern is not a 
law that is within the power of the protester to 
break-legalized abortion for example, or research 
using animals-direct disobedience is simply not an 
available option. Then civil disobedience must take 
other forms, requiring other justifications. Two 
options remain for one determined to break the 
law in protest: He may engage in disobedience that 
is indirect, deliberately violating some law that is not 
the object of protest but is symbolically related to 
it, or he may engage in direct action, unlawfdly 
interfering with the allegedly immoral practice. (And 
he may consistently do both.) 
Indirect Civil Disobedience 
Writing in defense of disobedience for the sake 
of animals one author says “Blocking an entrance 
to a building.. . is largely a symbolic act; it will not 
directly help animals ....” (Jackson, p. 38); and 
another writes ‘ I . .  .we will find ourselves violating 
ordinances that have nothing to do with our actual 
targets” (Seigel, p. 41). The irrelevance of the law 
broken to the law defended- “snarling rush-hour 
traffic in the [NyI City Hall area and blocking 
entrances to the Brooklyn Bridge for over an hour” 
(Davis, p. 33)-is in some cases an instrument of 
prideful defiance. But symbolic violations are 
difficult to j u s e  as obedience to higher law. If God 
commands us to oppose what is evil, He does not 
thereby demand that our tactics incorporate 
deliberate symbolic law-breaking. So the justification 
of indirect symbolic disobedience is generally 
utilitarian in form. Agitation, it is thought, will bring 
public education and eventual legislative reform. 
Disobedient acts, “bring AIDS political issues to the 
fore and serve to justify, implicitly, the violation of 
property rights ....” (Spiers, p. 34). And again, “civil 
disobedience.. . gives voice to energetic and creative 
supporters and has exposed the indifference of 
America’s institutions” (Novick, p. 36). 
All the problems utilitarianism is heir to will 
confront such an argument, of course. But in this 
context it is particularly difficult to determine 
whether, all things considered, the goods actually 
achieved by the disobedience really will outweigh 
the negatives. One defender correctly observes: 
“Someone considering breaking the law might ask 
herself: Will my action directly help animals? Will 
it attract media attention?. . . .What risks might be 
imposed on others? Could it be counterproductive?” 
(Jackson, p. 38). But because the defenders are utterly 
convinced that the practice opposed is plainly evil, 
they have no doubt that “[dlrawing media attention” 
(Nathanson, p. 28) is a very good thing. In fact their 
arguments often depend upon quite uncertain 
estimates of what the actual consequences of the 
disobedient acts will be. And the utilitarian defender 
may err in calculating those consequences. Such 
errors would be likely to have damaging effects upon 
the justification proposed. 
Thus, for example, deeply committed protesters 
are tempted to overestimate the effectiveness of what 
they do, crediting to their disobedience every change 
in the desired direction. In one essay, the expediting 
of cllnical trials of new drugs and the rapid 
development of community-based trials of experi- 
mental drugs for AIDS are presented as “[almong 
the most prominent results” of civil disobedience 
(Novick, p. 36). And there will be much angry 
opposition to their acts, as the protesters fully realize. 
But they contend that “pressuring the system” 
(Siegel, p. 41) through disobedience more than 
compensates for this negative. At times real damage 
will be done to others by the disobedient act “The 
destruction of property such as furs and laboratory 
equipment could become commonly approved as 
a viable mainstrean tactic” (Siegel, p. 41). Any such 
damage, they argue, will be outweighed by the 
enormity of the abuses being protested It may. But 
in doing these utilitarian calculations, what should 
be balanced against what? Against damage done by 
the disobedience we may not fairly weigh the good 
of eliminating the entire (alleged) injustice (since 
that is not the likely outcome) but rather the 
estimated amount of (alleged) good achieved toward 
that end by the damaging disobedient act. That may 
be little. Estimating utilities and disutilities accurately 
is very hard. 
Direct Action 
The third form of civil disobedience bears 
resemblance to both direct and indirect disobedi- 
ence, but differs from both. Here the protester, acting 
in a way that deliberately breaks the law, seeks to 
block the doing of the wrong he protests. ‘ ‘me  
must take our bodies down to the abortion mills 
and peacefully and prayerfully place ourselves 
between the killer and his intended victim” 
(Nathanson, quoting Randall Terry, p. 28). Hence 
the name: Operation Rescue. In direct action the 
disobedience is more than symbolic, because its aim 
is to avert particular wrongs. If abortion is the killing 
of babies, then even a single abortion not performed 
is a baby whose precious life has been rescued. 
Direct action is not direct disobedience, however, 
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since the law broken is not itself what is protested. 
Thus the appeal to a higher-law justification, 
although attractive to the practitioner of direct action, 
remains for him problematic. The disobedient who 
chooses to “storm into research facilities to film 
laboratory conditions or liberate animals” (Jackson, 
p. 3’7) will have some difficulty in claiming that he 
does so in obedience to the laws of God. Singer 
is correct when he says that the means chosen to 
achieve our goals “is a matter of strategy, not of 
ethics” (Singer, p. 43). 
But the defender of direct action has an auxiliary 
argument to present. Suppose, as Singer suggests, 
one assumes, “for the sake of argument, that they 
[the means chosen] were the only possible means 
of achieving those goals in a reasonable period of 
time.. .” Then, depending upon the worthiness of 
the goals, those means may indeed by justified. 
But under this defense of disobedience its moral 
justification depends upon both the truth of the claim 
that there is no other means of effectively advancing 
the disobedient’s cause, and the correctness of the 
disobedient’s judgment of the enormity of the evil 
he protests. 
That there is no other course remaining open 
to him the disobedient concludes from the fact that, 
although legislators have been lobbied, and vigorous 
lawfd protests repeatedly undertaken, his cause has 
not yet won the day. Since he believes he cannot 
be wrong about the evil, it must be that the system 
is in this sphere incapable of responding to the 
normal pressures of democratic process. If that 
process could work, he argues, it would have worked 
by now. But it hasn’t, so it can’t (An argument in 
this form could be used by most actively participating 
citizens whose objectives, morally important to them, 
have not yet been given the force of law.) 
Regarding the monstrous evil that is the object 
of their disobedient protest, the disobedients 
themselves have no doubts whatever. But if the 
public defense of direct action is to succeed, the 
enormity of that evil must be established in some 
objective way. 
And so we are brought again to the contrast of 
subjective and objective obligation. Suppose the evils 
[of abortion, of animal use, of AIDS policy] are as 
monstrous as these defenders of civil disobedience 
believe them to be. And suppose their estimates of 
the consequences of public disobedience are correct, 
and their judgments of the fruitlessness of other 
strategies also accurate. Then the deliberate 
violations of law they urge may indeed be morally 
justified. But the suppositions here are at least 
questionable. Many will conclude after deliberation 
that the premises of such arguments are seriously 
mistaken. Even those who largely share the moral 
convictions of the protesters may reach different 
moral decisions after reflecting upon the probable 
consequences of disobedience. And those who 
pursue the protesters’ objectives, but do so in more 
moderate spirit, having committed themselves to 
abide with the democratic process even when its 
outcomes are unsatisfactory and frustrating, will find 
the proffered justifications of deliberate disobedi- 
ence without merit. 
Three final remarks about these pieces: First, the 
essays concern civil disobedience in the world of 
bioethics. But other goals-concerning international 
relations, nuclear power, ethnic minorities-may 
also serve as the focus of conscientious, disobedient 
protest. Each defender of disobedience is account- 
able only for the law-breaking he holds to be justified 
by his goals. But the theoretical problems of 
providing a satisfactory moral justification apply 
generally. 
Second, those who engage in civil disobedience 
are commonly persons of peaceable spirit, with keen 
social conscience and respect for fellow citizens. 
Violence is thought by many to be precluded in 
civil disobedience, perhaps even by definition. But 
others say that they “must refuse to accept limits 
being placed on the lengths to which we will go” 
(Siegel, p. 41), and say candidly of violence that it 
“cannot be ruled out” (Spiers, p. 35). Violence in 
this arena has certainly not been forsworn. And the 
more violent the law-breaking, the more difficult its 
justification. From the tone, as well as from the literal 
meaning of the essays below, and from many 
recently reported events, it seems clear that some 
disobedients are fully prepared to destroy property. 
If the evils opposed are truly as monstrous and 
intolerable as they contend, arguments very similar 
to theirs might well be thought to justify some 
violence to persons as well. 
Finally, we are all likely to agree that the values 
of democratic process-patient and rational debate, 
compromise, and a commitment to bear with the 
outcome of the fairly expressed community will so 
long as it is bearable-are much to be prized. 
Deliberate violation of law to win the day may do 
injury to that social fabric on occasion. But it would 
be wrong to say that there are no occasions, no 
circumstances under which the deliberate violation 
of law is justifiable, even in a decent society. There 
are times when one must say no to the state. But 
the justification of deliberate law-breaking is never 
easy, and in a reasonably healthy democracy it is 
exceedingly difficult. Which, if any, of the defenders 
of civil disobedience below have succeeded in this 
task of justification remains for the reader to judge. 
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